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Abstract 
 
 
 
The Williams syndrome (WS) social phenotype is characterised by a high level of social 
engagement, heightened empathy and prolonged attention to people’s faces. These 
behaviours appear in contradiction to research reporting problems recognising and 
interpreting basic emotions and more complex mental states from other people. The current 
task involved dynamic (moving) face stimuli of an actor depicting complex mental states 
(e.g. worried, disinterested). Cues from the eye and mouth regions were systematically frozen 
and kept neutrally expressive to help identify the source of mental state information in typical 
development and WS. Eighteen individuals with WS (aged 8-23 years) and matched groups 
of typically developing participants were most accurate inferring mental states from whole 
dynamic faces. In this condition individuals with WS performed at a level predicted by 
chronological age. When face parts (eyes or mouth) were frozen and neutrally expressive, 
individuals with WS showed the greatest decrement in performance when the eye region was 
uninformative. We propose that using moving whole face stimuli individuals with WS can 
infer mental states and the eye region plays a particularly important role in performance.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Williams syndrome, facial expression, mental states, social cognition. 
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Can individuals with Williams syndrome interpret mental states from moving faces? 
 
In a social environment it is critical that we have the skills for successful interpersonal 
communication to allow smooth running interactions with the people around us. One skill 
that is particularly important is the ability to interpret information from the faces of our 
companions. The human face provides a wealth of information that is central to social 
communication (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). The face provides cues to identity, the 
importance of which is emphasised by the social interaction difficulties experienced by 
individuals with prosopagnosia (e.g. Yardley, McDermott, Pisarski, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 
2008). Equally important are communicative signals; such cues provide insights into 
emotions, thoughts and intentions that must be interpreted to allow us to adapt our behaviour 
appropriately. Individuals with some neuro-developmental disorders have problems 
interpreting communicative signals from faces, which may in turn have implications for 
social interaction styles. One such case is the genetically based neuro-developmental disorder 
Williams syndrome. 
 
Williams syndrome (WS) has a prevalence of 1 in 20,000 and is caused by a micro-deletion 
of approximately 25 genes on chromosome 7 (7q11.23; Korenberg et al., 2000). There has 
been a recent surge of interest in the social phenotype associated with WS and the nature of 
social interaction styles. The WS social profile is characterised by a strong interest or even 
propulsion towards social engagement (Jones et al., 2000; Frigerio et al., 2006). In research 
exploring the personality characteristics of children with WS, Klein-Tasman and Mervis 
(2003) found that the majority of children with the disorder (96% of their sample) showed 
behaviours associated with being ‘people-oriented’ and ‘sensitive’. The WS social profile is 
clearly very different to that associated with functioning on the autistic spectrum, although 
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social behaviour in neither group can be considered ‘typical’ (Brock,Einav, & Riby, 2008). 
Researchers have been particularly interested in the role of the face in the social approach 
style of individuals with WS. Social interest may manifest itself as intense attention towards 
human faces with prolonged face gaze (Mervis et al., 2003; Riby & Hancock, 2008, 2009), 
high levels of empathy toward people in distress (Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000) and an 
increased tendency to rate unfamiliar people as highly approachable (Jones et al., 2000). It is 
widely reported that individuals with WS rate unfamiliar faces as approachable that typically 
developing individuals would deem unapproachable (see Frigerio et al., 2006; Jones et al., 
2000) and this type of behaviour has been referred to as atypical social approach. Researchers 
have made an explicit link between the types of approach behaviour used by individuals with 
WS and their interest in attending to faces of other people. Recent research has suggested that 
such behaviours are unlikely to be due to ‘social stimulus attraction’ (Frigerio et al., 2006). 
There is little evidence that faces capture attention in an abnormal manner (Riby & Hancock, 
2009). Rather, such behaviours have been linked with frontal lobe impairment and poor 
social response inhibition (Porter, Coltheart, & Langdon, 2007). Indeed frontal lobe 
impairments are likely to contribute not only to the social behaviours that typify the disorder 
but also extrapolate to the cognitive phenotype of WS (Rhodes, Riby, Park, Fraser, & 
Campbell, in press). 
 
Given the highly social behaviours that are associated with WS, alongside claims of 
empathetic behaviour and an interest in attending to faces, it might be predicated that WS 
individuals would perform well on tasks involving expression perception. However, in 
studies of explicit emotion recognition ability, researchers have repeatedly found deficits and 
performance at a level characteristic of individuals with other forms of intellectual disability 
(Gagliardi, Frigerio, Burt, Cazzaniga, Perrett, & Borgatti, 2003; Plesa Skwerer et al., 2006a; 
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Plesa Skwerer, Verbalis, Schofield, Faja, & Tager-Flusberg, 2006b). When discriminating 
basic expressions of emotion from schematic faces (happy, sad), children with WS perform at 
a level comparable to mental age matched typically developing children (Karmiloff-Smith et 
al., 1995, exp. 1), even when completing a task designed for much younger individuals. 
Slightly more complex tasks, such as sorting faces based on emotional expressions (Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000, exp. 3) and recognising expressions of emotion from dynamic 
faces (Gagliardi et al., 2003) prove even more challenging. Finally Porter, Coltheart, and 
Langdon (2007) report that individuals with WS perform at a level comparable to mental 
(rather than chronological) age when recognising emotions (happy, sad, angry, scared) from 
faces, voices and body postures. All these tasks have focused on perception of the six basic 
emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise and disgust (Ekman, 1993). Claims of 
empathetic behaviour appear not to be entwined with strength at interpreting these basic 
facial expressions.  
 
More complex emotions (those of the ‘non-basic’ variety) can be considered as ones that 
involve cognitive parameters alongside the physiological correlates of basic emotions (see 
Zinck & Newen, 2008 for discussion). Examples include: worried, disinterested, jealous, 
amongst many others. The ability to ascribe such ‘mental states’ to others based on facial 
depictions of complex emotions is considered key to understanding others’ minds (see Zinck, 
2008). Together the ability to ascribe mental states (‘basic mentalising’) and the more 
complex skill of verbally attributing propositional attitudes to another person (‘theory of 
mind’) allow sophisticated interpersonal interactions and social understanding (Zinck, 2008). 
Real life social communication rarely relies solely upon basic expressions of emotion and 
often involves a range of much more complex mental states. The interpretation of complex 
emotional or mental states has been found to be problematic for individuals with some neuro-
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developmental and clinical disorders (e.g. autism, Baron-Cohen, 1995; schizophrenia, 
Kington, Jones, Watt, Hopkin, & Williams, 2000). Difficulties interpreting such cues are 
likely to be central to observed social communication styles. There have been a small number 
of previously published studies exploring the interpretation of complex mental states by 
individuals with WS. 
 
In an exploration of socio-perceptual (basic mentalising) skill, Tager-Flusberg, Boshart and 
Baron-Cohen (1998) assessed how well adults with WS could label photographs of faces 
depicting complex mental states. The task was derived from the ‘Reading the Mind from the 
Eyes’ assessment (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997) where only the eye region 
was available for viewing. The stimuli showed a strip of the face that included the eyes and 
were presented in black & white. This task has been widely applied to participants with 
autistic spectrum disorders (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste & Plumb, 2001) and has also been used with patients who have amygdala dysfunction 
(Adolphs, Baron-Cohen & Tranel, 2002). The task used by Tager-Flusberg and colleagues 
(1998) involved WS participants deciding which mental state was depicted in the eye region 
of the face stimuli (e.g. disinterested, worried). Participants were required to choose between 
two semantically opposite (for example sympathetic / unsympathetic) target descriptions for 
each trial (50% chance). Adults with WS (n=13) were compared to another population with 
reported social deficits; namely Prader-Willi syndrome. Although individuals with WS 
performed more accurately than those with Prader-Willi syndrome only 6 of the 13 
participants scored within a range predicted by age-matched typically developing individuals. 
The authors suggested that their study illustrated a relative ‘sparing’ of the cognitive capacity 
to mentalise, however the choice of comparison group, number of mental states and 
participants numbers make generalisations from this study somewhat difficult. The ‘Reading 
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the Mind from the Eyes’ task was revised in 2001 (Baron-Cohen , Wheelwright & Hill, 2001) 
and that version of the task, using four options for each answer and being more sensitive to 
subtle deficits of mental state perception, was used with a larger sample of individuals who 
had WS (n=43) . Plesa Skwerer and colleagues (2006) tested adults with WS who were 
compared to typically developing individuals and those with intellectual difficulties. The 
same participants completed the mental state task alongside a task involving moving faces for 
the interpretation of more basic emotional expressions. In Experiment 1 where participants 
interpreted mental states from the eye region, participants with WS performed at a level 
comparable to individuals with intellectual difficulties. In Experiment 2 where participants 
recognised basic expressions (happy, sad, fearful, angry, disgust, surprise) from moving faces 
shown in 5 second movie clips, individuals with WS again performed at a level comparable 
to their mental age. The authors concluded that when interpreting both basic expressions of 
emotion and more complex mental states individuals with WS perform at a level predicted by 
their mental (rather than chronological) age.  
 
There is a clear difference between the performance levels reported by Plesa Skwerer et al. 
(2006b; Experiment 1) and Tager-Flusberg et al. (1998) for the interpretation of mental state 
information. This difference is likely to relate to changes in procedures between studies (e.g., 
number of mental states assessed, number of answer options, sample size, choice of 
comparison group). The importance of adapting task design has also been shown by the fact 
that deficits inferring mental states from the eyes by individuals on the autistic spectrum have 
failed to be replicated across tasks that vary the procedures and stimuli that are used (e.g., 
Back, Ropar, & Mitchell, 2007; Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, de Clercq, & van der Heyden, 
2004). Importantly, changing the task requirements will inherently change the way that 
information is perceived and processed.  
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Relating to the previously reported behavioural performance, researchers have also attempted 
to pinpoint the neuropsychological underpinnings of social behaviour and emotional 
understanding in WS. Neuropsychological evidence has suggested that amygdala impairment 
may play a central role in the emotion deficits associated with WS (e.g. Martens, Wilson, 
Dudgeon, & Reutens, 2009). It is well recognised that the amygdala is critical to the 
perception of facial expressions (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1994) and 
individuals with amygdala damage have difficulty interpreting complex emotions from the 
eye region on the ‘Reading the Mind from the Eyes’ task (Adolphs et al., 2002). Individuals 
with WS also show abnormalities of amygdala structure and function (Haas, Mills, Yam, 
Hoeft, Bellugi, & Reiss, 2009). The role of the amygdala in the social phenotype associated 
with WS has attracted a great deal of attention (e.g. Jawaid, Schmolk, & Schulz, 2008; 
Martens et al., 2009; Jawaid, Riby, Egridere, Schmolck, Kass, & Schulz, in press). Research 
has considered how behaviours that are associated with the WS social phenotype relate to the 
behaviours shown by individuals with amygdala damage. It is recognised that adults with 
acquired amygdala damage also give abnormal social approach ratings to faces (e.g. Adolphs 
et al., 1994). However, Porter and colleagues (2007) have emphasised that on emotion 
recognition and social approach tasks individuals with WS do not replicate the pattern seen 
by individuals with acquired amygdala damage. Similarly, Frigerio and colleagues (2006) 
reject the notion that amygdala dysfunction causes abnormal social approachability ratings, in 
favour of the idea that individuals with WS have heightened ‘social drive’. However, Meyer-
Lindenberg, Mervis and Berman (2006) have showed abnormal amygdala-prefrontal 
connectivity in WS using fMRI. When individuals with the disorder attended to angry and 
fearful facial expressions they elicited reduced amygdala activation compared to typically 
developing individuals. Similarly, Plesa Skwerer and colleagues (2009) assessed involvement 
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of the amygdala through measurement of galvanic skin response, an amygdala-mediated 
measure (see Adolphs, 2001). Whilst attending to short movie extracts of actors presenting 
emotional expressions (happy, sad, fear, angry, disgust, and surprise), individuals with WS 
exhibited hypo-arousal compared to individuals with other forms of developmental delay. 
This hypo-arousal occurred alongside emotion recognition performance at the level predicted 
by mental age. Plesa Skwerer et al. (2009) concluded that their findings supported the notion 
of amygdala dysregulation and problems with connectivity to other brain regions involved in 
socio-emotional processing (e.g. orbitofrontal, medial prefrontal regions). Interestingly, 
hypo-arousal has also been found for individuals with WS during one-to-one interactions 
(Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2009), rather than attending to images on a computer screen. 
Therefore, evidence for the exact nature of amygdala dysfunction and its’ role in emotion 
perception (and the wider WS social phenotype) remains unclear but is highly likely to be a 
key candidate for understanding the neural underpinnings associated with social behaviours 
and socio-emotive skills in WS. 
 
We have emphasised the need to look at faces during social interactions to allow deciphering 
of subtle cues of thoughts or feelings. Typically developing adults and children show a 
preference for looking at the eyes and mouths of human faces as these regions convey 
important information (Martens, Siegmund, & Grusser, 1993). The results of research 
assessing mentalising capacity for individuals with autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) has 
focused on the role of processing information from the eye region. It is recognised that 
individuals with autistic disorder are less proficient at processing information from the upper 
face region, including the eyes (e.g. Langdell, 1978; Riby, Doherty-Sneddon, & Bruce, 
2009). Additionally, eye tracking research suggests that individuals on the autistic spectrum 
show reduced spontaneous allocation of attention to the upper region of faces (Riby & 
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Hancock, 2008). Together such findings are used to suggest that inattention to the upper face 
/ eye region throughout development is likely to contribute to problems inferring information 
from that region, for example mental states. Eye tracking research involving individuals with 
WS has also shown that this group allocates spontaneous attention to the upper face region 
atypically. However, the pattern of gaze is very different to that seen in ASD as atypically 
prolonged gaze (rather than reduced gaze) is allocated the eyes (Riby & Hancock, 2008). 
When attending to faces showing basic emotional expressions (neutral, happy, angry, fear) 
individuals with WS spend a larger proportion of their face gaze fixating on the eye region 
and other salient facial features (e.g. mouth, nose) than individuals developing typically 
(Porter, Shaw, & Marsh, in press) who distribute their fixations throughout the entire face. If 
the eye region is particularly important to mentalising capacity (as assessed by the previously 
detailed tasks) then it could be predicted that attention to this region would aid or even 
enhance performance for individuals with WS, in a manner very different to that seen for 
individuals on the autistic spectrum. However, the previously mentioned tasks assessing 
emotion and mental state processing by individuals with WS have not suggested enhanced 
sensitivity in this disorder group, irrespective of the increased allocation of attention to the 
eyes. As the eye region plays a more important role in the interpretation of mental states than 
basic emotions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), further research is required to understand the role 
of the eye region (within the whole face) for the interpretation of mental states by individuals 
with WS. 
 
Although a small number of studies, previously mentioned, have used moving faces in 
emotion recognition tasks (e.g. Gagliardi et al., 2003; Plesa Skwerer et al., 2006b), none to 
date have used moving faces for the interpretation of mental state information by individuals 
with WS. The mental state assessments utilised so far have been dominated by static black 
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and white stimuli showing just the eye region, which reduces the ecological validity that we 
encounter during more natural social interactions. In typical development, moving whole face 
stimuli have been found to aid performance in numerous types of tasks; for example face 
memory and learning (Lander & Bruce, 2003), the recognition of some basic emotions (sad, 
angry; Harwood, Hall, & Shinkfield, 1999) and importantly mental states (Back, Jordan & 
Thomas, 2009). Back and colleagues (2009; Experiment 1) found that the performance of 
typically developing adults on a mental state recognition task (e.g. using mental states such as 
anxious, disapproving, and relieved) was aided by the use of dynamic whole face stimuli. The 
task had the benefit of also using more naturalistic whole face images as opposed to cropped 
depictions of the eye region. When the researchers selectively froze face regions so that a 
particular region remained static and neutral (eyes, mouth, nose; Experiment 2), typically 
developing adults were especially hindered at recognising mental states when the eye region 
was frozen (considering, disinterest, doubtful, flirtatious, relieved, surprised) and also when 
the mouth was frozen (anxious, considering, relieved, surprised). These findings suggested 
that movement throughout the face is important for the detection of mental state information 
yet freezing the eyes had a detrimental effect across more mental states than freezing the 
mouth, emphasising their role in mental state detection. Although the addition of dynamic 
information has not been found to aid the recognition of basic emotions in WS (Gagliardi et 
al., 2003; Plesa Skwerer et al., 2006b), a task that investigates mental state inferences from 
dynamic faces has not previously been applied to this population.  
 
The present study builds upon existing knowledge of the socio-perceptual skills associated 
with WS and assesses the ability to recognise mental states from dynamic whole faces and 
dynamic faces with either the eye or mouth region frozen. This investigation will allow us to 
assess how well individuals with WS can infer mental states using an established task that has 
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not only been applied to typical development (Back et al., 2009) but has also been used with 
individuals with another neuro-developmental disorder, autism (Back et al., 2007). Findings 
from the study by Back et al., (2007) suggest that individuals with autism can use the eyes 
when inferring mental states and that they are just as successful as typically developing 
children when attributing mental states to exclusively the eyes. Importantly, in the present 
task for the whole face condition participants will be able to gain cues from all facial regions 
and this may aid performance on such tasks for individuals with WS who may have difficulty 
using isolated, unnatural, cropped face parts. By systematically freezing the eye or mouth 
regions to keep then neutrally expressive it will be possible to explore the relative 
contribution of these facial regions for the inference of mental state information, in 
comparison to the role played by these regions in typical development. As the upper face is 
particularly salient in typical development and WS (e.g. Riby et al., 2009), it is predicted that 
freezing the eye region will be detrimental to performance in both groups. It remains unclear 
whether the relative contribution of facial regions for inferring mental states will differ 
between typically developing participants and those with WS. However, we hypothesize 
(based on previous research exploring the allocation of attention to the eye and mouth 
regions, Riby & Hancock, 2008; Porter et al., in press) that for individuals with WS, freezing 
the eyes will cause a more severe decrement to performance than freezing the mouth. 
Interestingly, research has illustrated that removing information from the eye region (by 
covering the eyes with sunglasses) has a more detrimental impact upon facial identity 
matching ability for individuals with WS than those developing typically (Riby, in press). We 
extrapolate here to the investigation of mental state interpretation and explore involvement of 
the eye region. 
 
Method 
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Participants 
 
Eighteen individuals with WS were recruited through existing links with the Williams 
syndrome Foundation in the UK and all participants were involved in other ongoing studies. 
 
The participants ranged from 8 years 6 months to 23 years 6 months (mean 13 years 8 
months). All participants had previously been clinically diagnosed and also had their 
diagnosis confirmed with positive fluorescent in situ hybridisation (FISH) testing to detect 
the deletion of the ELN gene on the long arm of chromosome 7. The sample was comprised 
of 8 female and 10 male participants. Participants with WS were individually matched to 
three typically developing participants of comparable: i) nonverbal ability (NV) using the 
Ravens Coloured Progressive Matrices task (RCPM: Raven, Court, & Raven, 1990; max 
score 36) ii) verbal ability (V) using raw score on the British Picture Vocabulary Scale II 
(BPVS II; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997) and iii) chronological age (CA). All 
participant pairs were also matched on gender. Typically developing participants complied 
with inclusion criteria by scoring within the ‘normal’ behaviour range on the Strengths & 
Difficulties Questionnaire and therefore indicating the absence of difficulties in the areas of 
emotions, conduct, hyperactivity, peer relationships or pro-social behaviour (SDQ; total 
difficulties scores between 0-11; Goodman, 2001). The SDQ was completed by class 
teachers. 
 
Table 1 summarises the participant characteristics for all groups. Importantly individuals with 
WS did not differ from the nonverbal (NV) group on the basis on RCPM score (p=.36), they 
did not differ from the verbal (V) matched group on the BPVS raw score (p=.44) and they did 
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not differ from the chronological age (CA) matched group on the basis of age (p=.61). 
Informed consent was received for all participants prior to their involvement in the research. 
Before recruitment began the research was approved by the relevant Ethics Committees. 
 
Insert Table One 
 
Stimuli 
 
The stimuli were those previously used by Back and colleagues (2007) to assess mental state 
interpretation ability for individuals with autistic spectrum disorders. Further details about the 
development of the stimuli (including the full validation procedures, pilot testing and stimuli 
examples) and methods can be obtained from Back et al. (2007; 2009). See Back et al. (2007) 
for a full list of foils used for each mental state. One actor was used to depict all mental 
states, exactly replicating the previous research using these stimuli and procedures. Examples 
of the stimuli can be found at http://www.psychology.nottingham.ac.uk/staff/lpxeb.  
 
The dynamic colour stimuli consisted of eight mental states (deciding, don’t trust, 
disapproving, not interested, not sure, relieved, surprised, and worried), each of which was 
presented in three different display types (whole dynamic face, frozen eyes, and frozen 
mouth). The duration of each movie clip was 7 seconds, moving from neutral to fully 
expressive and returning to neutral. In the eye and mouth frozen conditions ‘freezing’ 
techniques had been applied to the stimuli so that motion was frozen (e.g. static with a neutral 
expression) in that region (eyes or mouth) while the rest of the face moved to develop the 
desired expression. Therefore, freezing the eye and mouth regions varied the amount of 
dynamic information available for mental state interpretation. 
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All stimuli were inserted as QuickTime clips into a PowerPoint presentation and a Dell 
Latitude D820 laptop computer was used for stimuli presentation. Throughout the task the 
stimuli were presented in a different random order across participants. In total the participant 
viewed each stimulus twice with the answer list randomised across presentations. Therefore 
there were a total of 48 trials (16 dynamic, 16 frozen mouth, and 16 frozen eyes). After the 
presentation of stimuli, participants were shown a list of four possible mental states (one 
correct answer plus three incorrect foils). The experimenter read loud the words for all 
participants that appeared simultaneously on the screen. The experimenter manually recorded 
the verbal response for each trial and scored task accuracy. 
 
Procedure 
 
Prior to the experiment, the mental states (those detailed above) and the foils were read aloud 
to participants in context to ensure an appropriate level of understanding (see Back et al. 
2007) and to give participants the opportunity to ask about any of the words / descriptions 
used in the task. The study was introduced to participants who sat in front of the laptop 
computer to attend to the stimuli and listen to task instructions. Participants were told that 
‘There will be lots of faces appearing on the screen in front of you, please look at each face 
carefully. After each face four words will appear on the screen; please choose the word that 
best describes what the person was thinking or feeling and say it out loud’ (replicating the 
instructions used by Back and colleagues (2007) for individuals with autistic spectrum 
disorders). Participants started with a practice trial to ensure they understood the instructions 
and task procedure. As previously detailed, after each clip the participant was presented with 
4 possible mental state labels (both on screen and read aloud by the experimenter) and they 
made their response to the experimenter. The task was self-paced and the answer options 
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remained on screen until a response was provided (each clip was only shown once per trial). 
No feedback was provided during the experiment. At the end of the experiment all 
participants were thanked for their time. 
 
Results 
 
Accuracy scores for inferring mental states from the different display types in the WS and 
control groups (NV, V, CA) were explored using a three-way ANOVA (mental state x 
display type x group). This revealed no main effect of mental state, F(7,476)=1.63, p= .125, 
np2= .023 (note that this may indicate a trend towards significance that may have been more 
robust with an increase in sample size). Looking at the mean performance of the WS group 
and all typically developing participants (n=54) in just the full face dynamic condition, there 
was some variability between mental states, although care is required exploring this non-
significant effect. In the WS group (also show in Figure 1) highest accuracy was seen for ‘not 
sure’ (mean 69%) and lowest accuracy is found for ‘don’t trust’ (mean 50%). Difficulty 
inferring the mental state ‘don’t trust’ was also the least accurate for the typically developing 
group (when considering all typically developing participants as one sample; mean 50%). For 
the typically developing sample the mental state inferred with greatest accuracy was relieved 
(mean 63%).  
 
There was a main effect of display type, F(2,136)= 133.19, p< .001, np2=.662 where t-tests 
showed that participants were most accurate at inferring mental states from the dynamic 
whole face than when either the eyes were frozen, t(71)=11.87, p<.001 or when the mouth 
was frozen, t(71)=10.10, p<.001. Moreover, freezing the eyes resulted in lower accuracy 
scores than freezing the mouth, t(71)= 3.61, p=.001. Interestingly, there was a main effect of 
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group, F(3,68)= 48.98, p< .001, np2= .684 and post-hoc tests (Tukey HSD) revealed that all 
groups significantly differed in accuracy scores (p< .001) with the exception of the matched 
verbal age group and WS group (p> .05). As indicated in Table 2, the mean scores for each 
group (collapsed across mental state and display type) are as follows: 64% for the CA group, 
50% for the V matches, 46% for WS, and 37% for NV matches. See Figure 1 for the 
breakdown of mental state and presentation style for the WS group. 
 
Insert Table Two 
 
There was also a significant interaction between display type and group, F(6,136)= 11.45, p< 
.001, np2= .336. This interaction was unpacked using t-tests and this revealed that all groups 
performed significantly better on the whole dynamic face compared to the eyes frozen and 
mouth frozen conditions (p< .01). Importantly, only the WS group had significantly lower 
accuracy rates when the eyes were frozen compared to when the mouth was frozen indicating 
that individuals with WS rely especially on the eyes rather than the mouth when inferring 
mental states from faces, t(17)= 6.93, p<.001, and showing more reliance on the eyes than 
individuals developing typically.  
Insert Figure 1 
 
The interaction between display type and group can also be explored by investigating the 
performance for each display type with a one-way ANOVA with factor Group. This revealed 
that for the whole dynamic face condition there was a significant difference between groups 
F(3,71)=12.41, p<.001. Individuals with WS performed at a level comparable to the 
chronological age matched group (between groups p>.05), showed a possible trend for 
increased performance in relation to verbal ability matches, t(17)=1.93, p=.07, and performed 
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significantly better than the nonverbal matches, t(17)= 4.61, p<.001. With the eye region 
frozen there was a significant effect of Group, F(3,71)=79.29, p<.001, individuals with 
WS performed significantly less accurately than the chronological age matches, t(17)=14.11, 
p<.001, the verbal ability matches, t(17)=16.12, p<.001 and the nonverbal matches 
t(17)=15.42, p<.001. Finally, for the frozen mouth trials there was also a significant effect of 
Group, F(3,71)=29.26, p<.001. Individuals with WS performed significantly worse than the 
chronological age matched group, t(17)=4.53, p<.001. There was a non-significant trend for 
the verbal matches to perform better than the WS group, t(17)=1.87, p=.07 and a trend in the 
same direction for the nonverbal matches, t(17)=2.03, p=.08. These patterns are evident in the 
mean performance levels shown in Table 2. No other interactions were significant (all Fs< 
.842, all ps> .753). 
 
The relationship between mental state interpretation and participant characteristics  
 
Although some care is required due to the small sample size of the WS cohort, we conducted 
a Pearson’s correlation to explore the relationship between overall task performance (across 
all mental states and presentation styles) and i) chronological age, ii) verbal ability (raw score 
on the BPVS) and iii) non-verbal ability (raw score on the RCPM). We collapsed the three 
groups of typically developing participants into one sample for this analysis (n=54) whilst 
also exploring these relationships in WS (n=18). For the WS group there was a significant 
relationship between age and ability to infer mental states (r=.70, p<.01). Increased age was 
related to greater proficiency. Mental state interpretation ability was also significantly 
positively correlated verbal ability (r=.61, p<.05) and nonverbal ability (r=.54, p<.05). For 
typically developing participants the pattern was repeated in that increased age (r=.64, 
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p<.001), verbal ability (r=.58, p<.001) and non-verbal ability (r=.50, p<.001) were all 
significantly correlated with increased mental state interpretation ability.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
This study assessed the ability to infer mental states from dynamic whole faces and faces 
where dynamic information was removed from the eyes or the mouth by keeping these 
regions neutrally expressive. The use of moving stimuli that systematically froze information 
in the eye and mouth regions was important to elucidate whether the facial features used by 
individuals with WS differed from typical controls. Typically developing individuals have 
previously been found to benefit from dynamic rather than static presentations for the 
inference of mental states as they include additional temporal information (Back, et al., 2009; 
Back, Ropar, & Mitchell, in prep). To date this task has been applied to typically developing 
adults (Back et al., 2009), typically developing children (Back et al., in preparation), 
individuals with autistic spectrum disorders (Back et al., 2007) and now individuals with WS 
have completed the dynamic condition of a mental state interpretation task. The current study 
showed that for typically developing participants as well as those with WS, when using 
dynamic information from faces it was easier to infer mental states from the whole face than 
just part of the face. Interestingly, when only part of the face showed the mental state 
individuals with WS showed most detriment to performance when the eye region was frozen 
in a neutral expression and thus uninformative (see Figure 1), but typically developing 
participants in the same study did not show this pattern. This cross-population comparison is 
particularly important and emphasises that when viewing the same stimuli groups may differ 
in the way that information is processed and interpreted. The finding suggests that the eyes 
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play a critical role in the interpretation of mental state information for individuals with WS 
and we tentatively suggest that they may play a more important role for this population than 
those developing typically. Individuals who are developing typically may utilise information 
dispersed throughout the face, not only the eye region. Both the eye and mouth regions 
together provide the most reliable source of mental state information for individuals 
developing typically as well as individuals with WS. It is highly likely that the changing 
‘configuration’ of features throughout the face is critical to mental state interpretation. For 
example, when an emotion is expressed the spacing between features will change throughout 
the entire face (referred to as second-order relational face information, see Diamond & Carey, 
1986). Participants with WS performed at a level comparable to their chronological age when 
the whole dynamic face was available to infer mental states and therefore these feature and 
configuration changes occurred throughout the whole face. However they performed less 
accurately than chronological matches across the task as a whole due to the inclusion of trials 
where only part of the face was emotionally expressive.  
 
Performing at a level predicted by chronological age when using whole dynamic faces 
indicates much better ability than that shown in previous research investigating socio-
perceptual capabilities (e.g. studies reporting performance at mental age capacity, Plesa 
Skwerer et al., 2006b). The notion of proficiency in interpreting mental states from whole 
moving faces appears to contradict evidence that individuals with WS have extreme problems 
with some forms of social functioning in their everyday lives. For example, many individuals 
have problems forming peer friendships and lasting relationships (e.g. Davies, Udwin, & 
Howlin, 1998), show deficits using relevant communication styles during interpersonal 
contact (e.g. Laws & Bishop, 2004) and suffer social isolation as an adult (Davies et al., 
1998; see Riby, Bruce, & Jawaid, in press, for a discussion of all these issues). Although 
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other studies report problems inferring mental states (e.g. socio-perceptual deficits) alongside 
widespread evidence of everyday social functioning difficulties, the current research 
tentatively suggests that socio-perceptual skills are not the sole cause of social interaction 
difficulties. It could be proposed that such difficulties are the result of other components of 
behaviour associated with WS as well as any possible problems using socio-perceptual skills. 
For example, social disinhibition and problems modulating behavioural responses play an 
important role in social expertise. Previous research has suggested involvement of the frontal 
lobe in social approach atypicalities reported in WS (e.g. Porter et al., 2007). Research has 
also suggested that attentional and executive control deficits, as well as other 
neuropsychological impairments are correlated with a range of behavioural problems in WS 
(as assessed using parent-rated questionnaires; Rhodes et al., in press). Further research is 
required to make explicit links between socio-cognitive and socio-perceptual skills and 
reports of everyday behaviours. It currently remains unclear whether the social behaviours 
that are associated with WS are related more to problems of social-perception (although the 
current research moves away from this interpretation) or to other components of behaviour 
(such as behavioural dysregulation). Importantly it is currently difficult to accommodate 
divergence between reports of social behaviours (especially those derived from parent reports 
when those parents may be aware of the reported characteristics of WS) and performance on 
socio-perceptual experimental tasks. Further research is required here to involve a range of 
methodologies with the same individuals.  
 
The previously conducted research in this area has been solely based on the ‘Reading the 
Mind from the Eyes’ task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997, 2001) where only the eye region is 
available and is shown as a static black & white image. Changing the task demands and the 
nature of stimuli (as well as differences of participant age and sample size) will impact upon 
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the ability to make comparisons across studies. However, taking into consideration the 
difference between the level of performance indicated by Plesa Skwerer and colleagues 
(2006b) and that shown here for whole faces, it is clear that the additional dynamic, colour, 
whole face stimuli aids the interpretation of mental states in WS (and in typical 
development). The increased naturalistic face images that involve temporal information for 
the presentation of dynamic mental states is clearly beneficial for task completion and may be 
important for consideration when trying to teach individuals with WS (as well as those with 
autism, based on evidence from the same task, Back et al., 2007) to interpret complex mental 
states. Although the current task did not involve a static condition and therefore it is not 
possible to make the comparison between static and dynamic representations on mental states 
in WS, work with typically developing individuals emphasises the importance of temporal 
information in numerous face tasks. Further work on the comparison between these two 
conditions is therefore warranted in WS. Studies of the nature provided here can be 
particularly useful in devising longer-term developmental projects exploring the development 
of socio-perceptual skills and general social functioning abilities. Future research may be 
more specifically focused on adapting the type of stimuli used here into a training program 
for children, adolescents and adults with the disorder. 
 
In everyday social interactions we do not encounter individuals who show different emotions 
expressed in the upper and lower face, or emotions restricted to one facial region. This could 
be confusing for individuals with WS, as well as individuals developing typically. However, 
previous research exploring mental state interpretation in WS has been limited to use of the 
‘Reading the Mind from the Eyes’ task and therefore black & white static depictions of the 
eye region. We suggested that the whole face dynamic information here allows participants to 
access cues that they might be more likely to use in everyday social interactions with real 
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people. Indeed Plesa Skwerer and colleagues (2006b) emphasise that such cues are missing 
from their research. It may be that these cues are especially important to individuals with WS 
and when using such cues they are able to perform at a level comparable to their 
chronological (rather than mental) age. Results for the whole face dynamic condition 
(indicating performance at a level comparable to chronological age) suggest that this task, 
with increased ecological validity, is more consistent with suggestions that individuals with 
WS are emotionally sensitive to other people (Dykens & Rosner, 1999; Gosch & Pankau, 
1997). However, the findings also need consideration alongside widely reported social 
deficits that accompany the disorder (e.g. peer relation and social communication difficulties, 
see Davies et al., 1998; Riby et al., in press). Finally, in the current study the lack of direct 
comparison between performance using static and dynamic stimuli with the same WS sample 
means that further work is required to explore whether the addition of temporal cues is as 
informative in this population as it is for typical adults.  
 
Previous research applying this task has shown that individuals functioning on the autistic 
spectrum are able to use the eye region to infer mental states (Back et al., 2007) even though 
previous research had suggested otherwise (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). The current study 
could be used to make similar claims regarding WS, whilst emphasising that not only do 
individuals with WS use the eyes but reliance upon this region is evident. Individuals with 
WS were the only group to show a detriment to performance when the eyes (compared to the 
mouth) was frozen and therefore neutrally expressive. We acknowledge that further research 
with a larger sample is required to investigate the trend evident in the current data when the 
mouth region was frozen. Research with typically developing participants and the work 
conducted here suggested that the mouth is important for conveying mental state information, 
but that the relative importance may differ in typical development and WS. If this is the case 
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then future research must use the most ecologically valid face stimuli as any unnatural 
manipulation may create more interference for individuals with WS than those developing 
typically. However, it is important to also note that similar research that has removed 
information from the eye region (using sunglasses) and the mouth region (using a scarf) to 
explore identity perception in WS has shown that only covering the eyes is so detrimental to 
individuals with WS (Riby, in press). This suggestion also fits with other existing evidence as 
it is reported that individuals with WS spontaneously attend to the eye region (but not the 
mouth region) for prolonged periods of time when viewing static and moving images of 
people and their faces (e.g. Riby & Hancock, 2008, 2009; Porter et al., in press). The current 
study emphasises reliance upon the eye region for inferring mental states by making 
information in this region uninformative. This was particularly detrimental to individuals 
with WS, and this was the only group to show the large dissociation between use of the eye 
and mouth regions. Typically developing participants do use information from the eyes but 
also rely upon information from the rest of the face (see Back et al., 2009), for example the 
mouth. 
 
It is important that we note the ways in which the current work could be improved in future 
explorations of this nature as there are a number of ways in which the results obtained here 
can be taken forward. Developing the work presented here is particularly important given the 
insights it has provided to our knowledge of socio-perceptual skill. The stimuli used here 
were those previously applied to typical development and individuals with autistic disorder 
(Back et al., 2007; 2009). However the stimuli only involved one actor depicting all mental 
states. Although a thorough validation procedure took place (see Back et al., 2007) we cannot 
be sure that the findings would generalize to different actors posing facial expressions for 
mental states. It might be that different actors would express mental states differently as there 
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might be several ways of facially expressing a given mental state. It could also be proposed 
that since the actor's identity remains constant across trials, it is possible for more processing 
resources to be engaged in decoding the expressions rather than considering identity. 
Therefore for the results to be generalised it is important for more than one actor to be 
involved across mental state stimuli. On a similar point, only eight mental states were chosen 
for this study and in the future it would be ideal to incorporate many more (with an 
accompanying increase in the number of trials completed by participants). Future research 
may include mental states purposely designed to assess interpretations of both positive and 
negative emotional states. Importantly, the mental states used in the current paper were the 
same eight mental states that had been previously used with participants on the autistic 
spectrum (Back et al., 2007). 
 
As well as modifications to the stimuli and procedure in future research there are a number of 
ways that exploration could tap important components of socio-perceptual skill that are not 
possible here, largely due to sample size. With a larger sample it would be possible to explore 
the impact of age and gender on mental state interpretation. The correlation analyses 
presented here indicate a significant increase in mental state interpretation ability with 
increased age (considering the full face dynamic condition). Some caution is required due to 
the WS sample size (n=18). It would be possible for research to explore the development of 
mental state interpretation with a larger sample to investigate the developmental trajectory of 
performance on this important socio-perceptual skill. This type of exploration could occur 
alongside other assessments of social functioning (using parent reports, observations of 
appropriate / inappropriate social encounters and experimental tasks that tap social expertise 
or social cognition). It would be useful to explore the development of mental state 
interpretation skills and also probe abilities of children and adolescents when skills are 
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continuing to develop. Targeting some problems as well as proficiencies that adolescents 
with the disorder have may allow for target training programs to aid social communication 
before other demands of adulthood (e.g. social independence) begin. With approximately 
73% of WS adults experiencing social isolation (Davies et al., 1998) and adults with the 
disorder showing communication and socialization problems (Howlin et al., 1998) it is 
important that programs that may aid social functioning target children as early as possible.  
 
 
Considering how evidence from this genetic disorder provides insights into the neural 
underpinnings of socio-perceptive skill, as previously noted attention has been drawn to the 
role of amygdala dysfunction. Individuals with amygdala damage are unable to infer mental 
states from the eye region using the ‘Reading the Mind from the Eyes’ task (Adolphs et al., 
2002) and previous research had suggested that the same was apparent for WS (e.g. Plesa 
Skwerer et al., 2006b). However the current study refutes this claim with performance at a 
level predicted by chronological age when the whole dynamic face is available. Haas and 
colleagues (2009) report that compared to typically developing individuals, individuals with 
WS show heightened amygdala reactivity to faces showing happy expressions but reduced 
amygdala reactivity to negative emotions (assessed using fearful faces). In terms of accuracy 
to infer mental states the current task did not show a specific problem for emotions with the 
most negative connotations (e.g. don’t trust, disapproving, not interested). If future research 
was to incorporate a wider variety of both positive and negative mental states it would be 
possible to explore any possible dissociation in more detail. It could be proposed that if 
individuals with WS show reduced activation of the amygdala to negative emotions, in 
addition to showing increased ratings of approachability to some unfamiliar faces, then we 
might have expected some emotion specific deficits in the WS group. However, there was no 
significant effect of mental state and no interaction between the mental state and group 
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suggesting there were no specific emotions (from the selection used here and the available 
sample size) that were more or less difficult for individuals with WS compared to typically 
developing participants. In the results section we note that both groups had most difficulty 
with ‘don’t trust’ suggesting this is a particularly difficult expression to interpret even when a 
whole moving face is on view (50% accuracy in typical development and in WS). Given that 
individuals with WS show abnormalities in their tendency to approach unfamiliar people that 
have been judged by typical individuals with by more / less trustworthy there is an interesting 
avenue for further research on the evaluation of trust from faces in WS.  
 
Although the current study did not include any direct measurement of neural mechanisms 
underpinning the interpretation of mental states, there are clear avenues for future 
investigations of this nature. It would be particularly beneficial to combine the current task or 
stimuli with fMRI or ERP measures (similar to Haas et al., 2009) to explore the functional 
importance of the social brain network in WS, especially with more ecologically valid stimuli 
than previously used. As well as these neuropsychological insights into mental state 
interpretation and the socio-cognitive network associated with WS, the current study provides 
a clear impetus to combine this task with eye tracking techniques to explore the distribution 
of attention to facial regions when individuals with and without WS make inferences about 
mental states. With evidence that individuals with WS show atypicalities in the spontaneous 
allocation of attention to faces showing basic expressions of emotion (Porter et al., in press) 
the inclusion of more complex mental states and dynamic stimuli is clearly warranted. 
 
In summary, the current research emphasises that in the experimental condition that most 
closely matched the type of information derived from faces in everyday social situations, 
individuals with WS performed at a level comparable to their chronological age when 
28 
 
inferring mental states. When part of the face was frozen (and emotionally neutral), 
individuals with WS showed the largest detriment when the eyes could not be used. However, 
all groups showed some contribution of the mouth region when deciphering mental states. 
Claims of an empathetic nature during social encounters fit well with this finding. The results 
also suggest that problems with socio-perceptual skill may not be the sole underlying cause of 
social interaction and peer relationship problems in WS. We propose that in previous research 
exploring mental states, the use of unnatural part-face stimuli does not give an accurate 
interpretation of socio-perceptual skill associated with WS. When using whole face stimuli 
individuals with WS rely on the eyes to infer mental states. 
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Table 1: Participant Characteristics 
 
  
WS 
 
NV matches 
 
V matches 
 
CA matches 
N 18 18 18 18 
C.A. * 13:08 (46) 7:01 (32) 10:01 (31) 13:09 (44) 
RCPM score + 14 (4) 15 (5) 20 (6) 27 (4) 
BPVS score ^ 99 (13) 90 (17) 101 (15) 125 (27)  
 
* Chronological age is provided as years : months(standard deviation in months) 
+ Max score possible is 36 and individuals are matched on raw score 
^ BPVS individuals are matched on their raw score (rather than standardised score) 
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Table 2: Proportion correct (standard deviation) for each Group and Presentation style as well 
as each Mental State (irrespective of presentation style) 
 
 WS NV matches a V matches b CA matches c 
     
Condition 
 
    
Total correct 0.46 (.06) 0.37 (.04) 0.50 (.10) 0.62 (.05) 
Full face 0.62 (.09) 0.49 (.07) 0.56 (.10) 0.65 (.08) 
Frozen eyes 0.29 (.05) 0.43 (.08) 0.43 (.08) 0.58 (.07) 
Frozen mouth 0.42 (.07) 0.47 (.11) 0.47 (.11) 0.56 (.10) 
     
     
Mental State 
 
    
Deciding 0.45 (.28) 0.35 (.22) 0.55 (.17) 0.65 (.16) 
Disapproving 0.43 (.25) 0.37 (.15) 0.52 (.23) 0.65 (.22) 
Not interested 0.47 (.26) 0.44 (.22) 0.51 (.21) 0.60 (.20) 
Relieved 0.44 (.21) 0.42 (.17) 0.53 (.17) 0.65 (.20) 
Worried 0.51 (.21) 0.34 (.16) 0.53 (.27) 0.62 (.24) 
Surprised 0.49 (.23) 0.36 (.18) 0.46 (.21) 0.61 (.24) 
Not sure 0.58 (.19) 0.33 (.18) 0.51 (.24) 0.57 (.21) 
Don’t trust 0.31 (.24) 0.31 (.17) 0.44 (.21) 0.58 (.21) 
     
 
 
a
 Typically developing participants matched to the WS group on nonverbal ability 
 
b
 Typically developing participants matched to the WS group on verbal ability 
 
c
 Typically developing participants matched to the WS group on chronological age 
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Figure Captions 
 
 
Figure 1:  
 
Accuracy (percentage correct) for each of the 8 mental states in each presentation condition 
for individuals with WS 
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Figure 1 is continued on the following page 
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Figure 1 continued:  
 
